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A PLEA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Stephen M. Feldman*
We live in the age of Democracy, Inc.1 Political advertisements
package candidates in twenty second sound bites. Corporations and
billionaires wield herculean political power. Although citizens still vote—
at least once in a while—corporate muscle largely steers elections and
government policy to increase profits. Income inequality, consequently,
has skyrocketed.2 In the late-1980s, CEO pay stood at thirty times the
average pay for workers, while today CEO pay is nearly 300 times that of
workers.3 Yet, conservatives warn that any government efforts to
alleviate wealth or income inequality will only worsen matters. How
often is Ronald Reagan’s first inaugural address echoed? “[G]overnment
is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”4 In fact, a
2014 Gallup poll revealed that far more Americans view government, and
not inequality, as the greatest problem facing the nation today.5
Conservatives, moreover, have a ready response to complaints about
rising inequality. Unstoppable market forces, they argue, cause

* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct
Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming.
1. Democracy Incorporated is the title of a book by Sheldon S. Wolin, SHELDON S.
WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED: MANAGED DEMOCRACY AND THE SPECTER OF INVERTED
TOTALITARIANISM (2008), while Democracy, Inc. is the title of a book by David S. Allen,
DAVID S. ALLEN, DEMOCRACY, INC.: THE PRESS AND LAW IN THE CORPORATE
RATIONALIZATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2005).
2. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–26, 298, 571 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
3. Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers
Are Paid Less, ECON. POL’Y INST., June 12, 2014, at 1, 3, http://www.epi.org/files/2014/ceopay-continues-to-rise.pdf.
4. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981).
5. See Frank Newport, Few Americans Want More Gov’t Regulation of Business,
GALLOP (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/176015/few-americans-gov-regulationbusiness.aspx.
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increasing inequality.6 From this perspective, our high-technology world
justifiably rewards advanced technical skills and knowledge.7 The rich, in
other words, merit their wealth.
The five conservative justices of the Roberts Court—John Roberts,
the late Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and
Samuel Alito—have stamped Democracy, Inc., with a constitutional
imprimatur. In numerous cases, the Court has shielded the economic
marketplace from government power and regulation. In National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Affordable Care Act
case, the conservative bloc severely limited Congress’s reach and
invalidated a key provision in the statute (the expansion of Medicaid).8 In
Citizens United v. FEC9 and its progeny,10 the Court prohibited most
government restrictions on monetary spending for political campaigns.
Empirical studies rank the Roberts Court as the most pro-business
Supreme Court since World War II.11 In a grading of individual justices,
all five of the aforementioned Roberts Court conservatives rank among
the top ten justices most favorable to business since 1946.12 Alito and
Roberts stand first and second on the list, respectively.13 Significantly,
the conservative justices often justify their pro-business decisions,
bolstering Democracy, Inc., by invoking originalist sources. Originalism,
in theory, requires the justices to enforce either the original public
meaning of the Constitution or the framers’ intentions.14 Scalia and
Thomas are avowed originalists, but the other conservatives also use
originalist arguments and join originalist opinions.15 In Citizens United,

6. See Edward P. Lazear, Chairman, President’s Council of Econ. Advisors, Remarks
at the Hudson Inst.: The State of the U.S. Economy and Labor Market (May 2, 2006)
(articulating the conservative viewpoint). But cf. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A
LIBERAL 132–33 (2007) (noting there is little empirical support for claim that inequality is
increasing because of technology and market forces).
7. See Lazear, supra note 6.
8. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
9. 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010).
10. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
11. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in
the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1455–57 (2013).
12. Id. at 1450–51.
13. Id.
14. Focusing on the original public meaning is referred to as “new originalism,” while
focusing on framers’ intentions is “old originalism.” Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional
Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 283, 285,
292 (2014).
15. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–626 (2008) (relying on
originalism to interpret the Second Amendment); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184–88 (1989) (advocating for originalism).
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for instance, Kennedy’s majority opinion underscored that the decision
corresponded with originalism.16
Libertarian legal scholars such as Richard Epstein and Randy
Barnett lend intellectual heft to the Court’s endorsement of Democracy,
Inc. Epstein, for instance, has exhaustively defended “the original
classical liberal constitutional order,” as he puts it.17 Following a
“guarded originalist view,” Epstein argues that “classical liberal theory”
animated the framers in their drafting of the Constitution.18 That is,
according to Epstein, the framers drew on classical liberal theorists such
as John Locke and Adam Smith and committed normatively to “the twin
pillars of private property and limited government.”19 When Epstein says
“limited government,” though, he means minimal government because
government, to him, is no more than “a necessary evil.”20 Epstein
maintains that the “Constitution embraces a theory of laissez-faire.”21
The government, from this perspective, cannot implement any programs
that would entail “income redistribution.”22 The predominant purpose of
the constitutional system is to protect competitive markets and the rights
of individuals “to enter and exit” those markets.23
Despite the conservative invocations of originalism, the Court’s
decisions protecting economic liberties and restricting government power
contravene the Constitution. The conservative justices might not
intentionally break faith with constitutional principles, yet the betrayal
is just as real—and just as dangerous. The justices, for the most part,
sincerely apply constitutional text, doctrines, and precedents in accord
with their political views.24 Yet, the conservative bloc’s decisions have
generated unintended and perverse consequences. The justices believe
they are upholding and protecting the American way of life, but they
instead have placed our democratic-capitalist system in its gravest
danger since World War II.
A 2012 Roberts Court case, with a history stretching back more than
a century, illustrates how the conservative bloc’s fundamentalist
16. See 558 U.S. 310, 353–55 (2010).
17. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 6 (2014).
18. Id. at 45.
19. Id. at ix (invoking Locke and Smith).
20. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 582. Government should not intrude into “individual decisions” as to “what
property to own, food to buy, jobs to offer or accept, or wages to pay or receive.” Id. at 25.
22. Id. at 582.
23. Id. at 7; see also id. at 37; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION
317–18 (2004); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 160–67 (1998).
24. See Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics Into
Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 94–95 (2014).
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protection of the marketplace can undermine democracy.25 Montana, in
the late nineteenth-century, was the Wild West of politics, where bribery,
extortion, and dirty dealing ruled the day.26 In the early 1880s, Marcus
Daly bought a mine, the Anaconda, located in the Montana territory.27
Needing money for development, he persuaded a group of California
capitalists to invest.28 Within four years, the Anaconda Company had
built the world’s largest copper smelter, and Montana’s floodgates to
outside wealth and corporate control opened wide.29 When Montana
became the forty-first state in 1889, the primary source of wealth was
mining, and copper led all the metals, surpassing silver and gold.30
Corporations rushed to the state to invest in copper, with Anaconda going
public in 1891.31 Daly’s former friend turned copper-mining rival, William
Clark, craved one of the state’s two U.S. Senate seats.32 Defeated twice
because of Daly’s opposition, Clark finally just purchased a seat by
bribing state legislators (the Constitution, at the time, vested state
legislatures with the power to choose senators).33 None other than Mark
Twain wrote that Clark “bought legislatures and judges as other men buy
food and raiment. By his example he has so excused and so sweetened
corruption that in Montana it no longer has an offensive smell.”34
A tidal wave of corporate mergers swept over the nation in the 1890s
and engulfed the copper-mining industry.35 Standard Oil, already a
corporate giant, sought control of Anaconda along with additional mining
companies, but the Montana Supreme Court blocked the merger.36
Anaconda’s attorney helped shove a bill countering the judicial decision
through the legislative process.37 The governor, however, vetoed the bill.38
Mixing his metaphors, he warned Montanans: “If you do not assert your
25.
26.

See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
See MICHAEL P. MALONE & RICHARD B. ROEDER, MONTANA: A HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 152–77 (1976).
27. Id. at 153–54.
28. Id. at 154.
29. See id. at 154–58.
30. See id. at 157–58.
31. Id. at 158; see also C.B. GLASSCOCK, THE WAR OF THE COPPER KINGS: THE BUILDERS
OF BUTTE AND WOLVES OF WALL STREET 306–10 (1935); KENNETH ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA:
AN UNCOMMON LAND (1959).
32. MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 26, at 159.
33. Id. at 164–66.
34. TOOLE, supra note 31, at 174, 186–94; MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN IN ERUPTION 72
(Bernard DeVoto ed., 1940).
35. See MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 26, at 158.
36. See id. at 171–72.
37. TOOLE, supra note 31, at 165.
38. Id.
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independence now and defeat this measure, it will be too late when the
tentacles of this octopus have fastened their fangs on the strong limbs of
this fair commonwealth.”39 Standard Oil was prepared for this
resistance.40 It had already bought several state newspapers, which now
pressured legislators to support the corporate interests.41 The legislature
buckled and overrode the governor’s veto.42 Standard Oil gained control
of Anaconda and the other mining enterprises, and shifted them into a
holding company, Amalgamated Copper (“Amalgamated”).43
Soon, though, a charismatic mining engineer, Frederick Heinze,
reached to grab a cut of the copper mining profits.44 Exploiting his
camaraderie with local judges, he used the state courts to attack
Amalgamated’s mining interests.45 In response, Amalgamated shut all of
its Montana businesses except for the newspapers, and threw four-fifths
of the state workers into unemployment.46 Amalgamated’s newspapers
blamed Heinze, whose popularity withered like a rose in a Montana
snowstorm.47 The governor succumbed to pressure and called a special
session of the legislature, which accommodated Amalgamated by passing
a statute allowing corporations to choose friendly trial court venues.48
The Idaho State Tribune lamented: “[i]t took the Amalgamated Copper
Company just three weeks to coerce Montana into falling on her knees
with promises of anything that big corporation might want.”49
The corrupt cheated the corrupt, and the legislature was bought and
paid for.50 But Montana citizens fought back.51 Bypassing the legislature,
voters approved an initiative in 1912 that prohibited corporations from
spending money in the state on political campaigns.52 For nearly a
century, this law controlled corporate campaign financing in Montana.53
Citizens had wielded democratic power and successfully checked
corporate interests bent on manipulating state institutions for profit.54
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 26, at 170–72.
MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 26, at 167–68.
Id. at 172–73.
Id. at 174.
See id.
Id. at 175.
Id.
See id. at 176–77.
See id. at 196–97.
See id.
See id. at 196.
See id.
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But in 2010, corporations challenged the law as violating the national
and Montana constitutions.55 The Montana Supreme Court, emphasizing
the sordid state history, rejected the challenge.56 According to the court,
the law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling purpose,
preventing corporate corruption of the Montana democratic process.57
The corporations, though, did not quit. They expected the pro-business
Roberts Court to look favorably on an appeal, and the conservative
justices did not disappoint. In American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock, the conservative bloc deemed the history irrelevant.58 The
democratic desires of the Montana people were beside the point. In a
brief one-paragraph opinion, the Court stated “[t]here can be no serious
doubt that” Citizens United controlled.59 The state restriction on
corporate campaign spending was unconstitutional.60 For the first time
since 1912, corporations could spend money to influence—or control—
political campaigns in Montana.61
Decisions such as Citizens United and American Tradition
Partnership blatantly undermine democracy. Empirical studies
demonstrate that excessive spending on political campaigns skews
government processes.62 Yet, the conservative justices and scholars
maintain that an originalist reading of the Constitution supports such
decisions.63 They ground this conclusion, however, on an egregious
distortion of the framing.64
55. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2011), rev’d,
132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id.
58. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 120–26 (2008); MARTIN GILENS,
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE 137 (2012); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON
POL. 564, 571–77 (2014); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign
Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO. L. REV. 2365, 2368–69 (2010).
63. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 353–55 (2010).
64. Helpful sources on the framing include the following: RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN,
HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009) (containing a
comprehensive historical overview of the characters, issues, and conflicts involved in the
1787 drafting of the Constitution); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORU: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) (containing a thorough examination of
the Constitutional Convention, reconstructing the issues debates and political
environment); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (offering a new theory regarding the framers desired protection
of private property); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975) (examining
Machiavellian theory within the context of the American Revolution); GORDON S. WOOD,
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To understand the Constitution, one must appreciate what was at
stake for the framers in 1787. Most important, they believed the nation’s
existence depended on their actions.65 They were committed to the
principles of republican democratic government, but they feared that the
American experiment, vesting sovereignty in the people, had veered
awry.66 And if the American republic failed, the dream of nonmonarchical government might perish with it. Yet, the framers also
realized that individual liberty necessarily encompassed the protection of
property rights.67 Democratic majorities could not be allowed to seize
property or other wealth for no reason other than the fact of raw
majoritarian power. The framers, therefore, faced a conundrum: How
could they invigorate republican democratic government while
simultaneously protecting individual liberty, including property rights?68
Laboring through the hot summer months of the convention, the framers
hammered out a practical solution: National survival depended on a
relative balance between public and private spheres of activity.69
During the Revolutionary years and under the Articles of
Confederation, in the 1780s, most government power rested with the
states, and most state constitutions assumed the people would virtuously
pursue the common good.70 American leaders of this time were political
idealists. They conceptualized the citizen-self as predominantly
virtuous.71 Virtue alone, they believed, would sustain the republican
state governments.
But the United States was not a utopia. Many citizens seemed more
concerned with their own advantages than with a communal or public
good.72 By the mid-1780s, state governments were corrupt, the nation’s
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776—1787 (1969) (offering a thorough analysis
of the political culture during the constitutional framing). For the most complete record of
the Constitutional Convention, see generally THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Farrand].
65. JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1787),
reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69 (Library of Am., 1999); BEEMAN, supra note 64,
at 27–29.
66. NEDELSKY, supra note 64, at 5.
67. Id. at 6, 12.
68. Id. at 7.
69. “Madison’s political thought was characterized by an often agonized effort to find a
working balance between the rights of property and republican principles.” NEDELSKY,
supra note 64, at 12.
70. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 63–66 (2001).
71. Id. at 125–27.
72. WOOD, supra note 64, at 409–13; see also James Wilson, In the Pennsylvania
Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra note 64, at 138, 141–42, app. A (lamenting
licentiousness of citizens and government problems).
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finances were in tatters, and property was insecure.73 National political
leaders had begun to fret about the country’s survival. Shays’s Rebellion
in Massachusetts finally spurred these leaders to action. Daniel Shays, a
former Revolutionary War militia captain, led an armed insurrection of
indebted farmers threatened with foreclosures.74 Although the state
forcefully suppressed the rebellion, Shays’s supporters soon elected
enough new legislators that the Massachusetts assembly enacted
statutory protections for debtors.75 In fact, many national political
leaders worried more about the electoral aftermath than the armed
rebellion.76 John Jay wrote to George Washington: “Private rage for
property suppresses public considerations, and personal rather than
national interests have become the great objects of attention.
Representative bodies will ever be faithful copies of their originals, and
generally exhibit a checkered assemblage of virtue and vice, of abilities
and weakness.”77 Washington replied that Revolutionary leaders
“probably had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our
confederation. . . . [P]erfection falls not to the share of mortals.”78 But he
brooded most about the future of republican government. “[W]hat a
triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that we are incapable of
governing ourselves, and that systems founded on the basis of equal
liberty are merely ideal and fallacious!”79
The alarm and insecurity expressed by Jay and Washington typified
the attitudes of the delegates who arrived in Philadelphia in 1787 for
what became the Constitutional Convention. As the delegates/framers
evaluated matters, adherence to abstract ideals had led the nation to the
edge of a precipice. If the nation did not change direction, it would likely
fall into an abyss, amid the ruins of government decay. By necessity,
then, the framers began with a more realistic outlook. They recognized
that the citizen-self was driven by passions and interests, which could be
controlled by reason and virtue, but only at certain times and under the

73.
74.

WOOD, supra note 64, at 409–11.
LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION 1–2, 6 (2002); DAVID P. SZATMARY,
SHAYS’ REBELLION 66 (1980).
75. SZATMARY, supra note 74, at 119.
76. BEEMAN, supra note 64, at 17–18.
77. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (June 27, 1786), reprinted in 2 GREAT
ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 80, 81 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958); see also BEEMAN, supra
note 64, at 16–18 (describing perceptions of Shays’s Rebellion); WOOD, supra note 64, at
410–13 (discussing Shays’s Rebellion).
78. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 1, 1786), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch5s11.html.
79. Id.
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right conditions.80 Beginning with this more complex view of human
nature—of the citizen-self—the framers attempted to build a
constitutional system.81
The framers distinguished two spheres: that of civil society and that
of government. The government sphere was the realm of public affairs,
while civil society was the realm of private affairs, such as commercial
intercourse and the accumulation of property.82 In the public sphere,
American government was to be republican-democratic.83 Citizens and
elected officials were supposed to act virtuously by pursuing the common
good rather than their own partial or private interests.84 The Preamble of
the Constitution memorialized the government goal: “We the People”
were to “promote the general [w]elfare.”85 When citizens or officials used
government institutions to pursue their own interests, then government
was corrupt. Groups of like-minded citizens who corrupted the
government were deemed factions. In Federalist Number 10, James
Madison described a faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.”86 The framers wanted to prevent factions—even if they were
democratic majorities—from using the government for their own private
advantage. Yet, factionalism was foreordained because many, if not most,
citizens were motivated to pursue their own passions and interests not
only in the private, but also in the public world. For that reason, the
80. Farrand, supra note 64, at 376 (containing Hamilton’s remarks from June 22, 1787
on the nature of the citizen-self).
81. Id.
82. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 14 (James Madison). “The founders of the United States
did indeed define and construct their new nation in accord with Enlightenment doctrines of
individual liberties and republican self-governance more than any regime before and most
since . . . .” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 470–71 (1997).
83. See WOOD, supra note 64, at 222–23, 230–31, 586.
84. Id. at 59 (“[A]ll would be ‘disinterested men, who could have no interest of their own
to seek,’ and ‘would employ their whole time for the public good; then there would be but
one interest, the good of the people at large.’”). The founders themselves did not agree on a
precise definition of republican government. GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND
THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 44–45 (1970). My definition of republican
democracy overlaps but is not identical with some technical definitions of civic
republicanism. See RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 9–
12 (1992) (discussing definitional problems related to civic republicanism).
85. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (emphasis added); see also JAMES
MADISON, IN VIRGINIA CONVENTION, June 5, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON:
HIS BASIC WRITINGS 46, 46 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) (arguing that majority factions have
produced unjust laws).
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framers devoted much of the convention to designing government
institutions that would control the effects of factionalism and induce
elected officials to pursue the common good.87
In the private sphere, unlike the public realm, passions and interests
were to have free rein.88 The predominant interest driving individuals in
the private or commercial realm was the desire for property.89 But the
framers and other Americans understood the concept of property in more
of a mercantilist than capitalist sense.90 Mercantilism—beginning in the
sixteenth century, when nation-states arose—entailed close ties between
governments and merchants.91 In general, a government would grant a
monopoly to a merchant or company—for instance, the Hudson Bay
Company—to allow the merchant to develop a particular market, often
times in a colony.92 The primary purpose of a mercantilist enterprise was
to enhance the treasure (gold and silver) and military power of the
mother country.93 In other words, while mercantilism relied on an
economic market, it was not based on a competitive free market, the crux
of capitalism.94 Rather, in a mercantilist system, the state and economy
intertwined closely, working together for common purposes through the
creation of monopolies and the implementation of protectionist policies.95
In such a system, property rights were inherently limited.96 At the time
of the constitutional framing and ratification, capitalism had not yet fully
87. MCDONALD, supra note 64, at 189–209; NEDELSKY, supra note 64, at 37; POCOCK,
supra note 64, at 513–26; WOOD, supra note 64, at 39–46.
88. See WOOD, supra note 64, at 24, 410–11, 609 (distinguishing forms of liberty).
89. Id. at 218.
90. Helpful sources discussing economic development include the following: JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, A HISTORY OF ECONOMICS (1987); ROBERT HEILBRONER & WILLIAM
MILBERG, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC SOCIETY (10th ed. 1998); ROBERT HEILBRONER &
AARON SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA: FROM 1600 TO PRESENT
(1999); RONALD E. SEAVOY, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 1607 TO
THE PRESENT (2006). Helpful sources discussing the development of corporations as well as
globalization include the following: ALFRED D. CHANDLER & BRUCE MAZLISH, Introduction,
in LEVIATHANS 1 (Alfred D. Chandler & Bruce Mazlish eds., 2005); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC
MIRROR (1989); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780—1860
(1977); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995);
Alfred D. ).
91. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Mercantilism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/mercantilism (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
92. GALBRAITH, supra note 90, at 39–42; HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 90, at 26–
27.
93. GALBRAITH, supra note 90, at 39–42.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 39–40; HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 90, at 26–27.
96. WOOD, supra note 64, at 218–19.
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emerged in England; it had developed even less in the United States.97
The framers and other Americans could not have understood the economy
as being truly capitalist, much less laissez-faire.98
The framers’ multiple discussions and ultimate acceptance of slavery
as a legal institution illustrated both their desire to protect property and
their incomplete adoption of capitalism.99 All of the framers were white
men.100 Almost all were Protestant, and most were wealthy.101 Many
owned slaves.102 In 1787, slaves constituted approximately twenty
percent of the American population, with the percentage higher in the
southern states.103 Yet, the framers could not anticipate how important
slavery would soon become to the American economy.104 In 1793, Eli
Whitney would invent the cotton gin and revolutionize the cotton
industry.105 In short order, cotton would become an incredibly lucrative
crop, heavily reliant on slave labor.106 Slave-supported cotton production
would fuel the southern economy while also bolstering the northern
textile industry.107 But when the framers met in Philadelphia, nobody
knew about the future and King Cotton. Several northern states had
already begun moving toward emancipation. The upper South, it seemed,
might soon follow.108
Nevertheless, the framers overwhelmingly viewed slaves as property,
and as South Carolinian Charles Cotesworth Pinckney put it, “property
in slaves should not be exposed to danger.”109 A scarce few delegates
denounced slavery as immoral, with Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania
uttering the strongest condemnation.110 “It was a nefarious institution,”
97. See id.
98. HEILBRONER & MILBERG, supra note 90, at 55; see also HORWITZ, supra note 90, at
xiii–xiv (agreeing that the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries were not laissezfaire).
99. See BEEMAN, supra note 64, at 308–15.
100. See id. at xix–xxiii.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 309–11.
103. Id. at 310–11.
104. See Mary Bellis, The Cotton Gin and Eli Whitney, ABOUT MONEY,
http://inventors.about.com/od/wstartinventors/a/cotton_gin.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. HALL, supra note 90, at 130; SEAVOY, supra note 90, at 111.
108. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 519–24 (2009); see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW
21–25 (6th ed. 2008) (listing years in which northern states abolished slavery); PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS ix (3d ed. 2014) (detailing when states eliminated
slavery).
109. 1 Farrand, supra note 64, at 594 (July 12, 1787).
110. 2 Farrand, supra note 64, at 221 (Aug. 8, 1787).
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he declared.111 “It was the curse of heaven on the States where it
prevailed.”112 Yet, one cannot but be struck by the usual reactions to
these moral denunciations. Silence—or at most, quick dismissal.113 John
Rutledge spoke for many delegates when he explained: “Religion &
humanity had nothing to do with this question—[i]nterest alone is the
governing principle . . . .”114
During the many discussions of slavery, no delegates protested that it
would contravene the most fundamental principles of a capitalist
economy.115 Capitalism depends on the drive for profit in a competitive
free market.116 Slavery is the antithesis of a modern free market; it is
coerced labor.117 Slavery, though, appeared consistent with a mercantilist
and pre-modern economy. Under the American common law of the lateeighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, duties arose because of
established status-relationships. The common law, for example, attached
a specific duty of care to many occupations. Innkeepers owed a duty of
protection to lodgers, while ferrymen owed a duty of safe transportation
to travelers.118 Slave and master constituted a status-relationship within
this pre-modern worldview.119
Although the framers worried about protecting property rights,
including property interests in slaves, they did not view the protection of
property as the “be-all” and “end-all” of the Constitution.120 “To secure
the public good and private rights,” Madison explained, “and at the same
time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.”121 The framers
sought to construct a stable and workable government system that would
mediate the conflict between private passions and interests, on the one
side, and public goods, on the other.122 They wanted to protect individual
rights, especially property rights, but they simultaneously wanted to
promote the virtuous pursuit of the common good.123 The crux, then, of
the constitutional scheme was pragmatic balance: balance between the
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 364.
115. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 90, at 9–10, 129.
116. Id. at 9–10.
117. Id. at 9–10, 134–35.
118. ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO
NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM 235, 279 (2005).
119. FRIEDMAN, supra note 90, at 225–26; HALL, supra note 90, at 131.
120. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. NEDELSKY, supra note 64, at 12.
123. See id.
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public and private spheres—between government power and individual
rights.124
Unlike the Roberts Court conservatives, the framers never treated
wealth and property rights as sacrosanct. The framers were not market
fundamentalists. They were pragmatic realists who rejected utopianism,
whether in relation to government or economics. Moreover, they
understood that the crucial public-private balance ultimately depended
on government empowerment to control private interests when they
threatened the common good—including when they threatened to twist
the government for their own profit.125 As James Wilson explained, “no
government . . . can exist, unless private and individual rights are
subservient to the public and general happiness of the nation.”126 Private
entities, including corporations, could not be allowed to control the
government for their own benefit.127
Today, though, we live in Democracy, Inc., where the private
subsumes the public. The complete history of the nation’s long journey
from the framers’ balanced constitutionalism to Democracy, Inc., is
beyond the scope of this Essay. In brief, the balanced system proved
resilient, but it was not static. Social, cultural, and economic forces
pressed the system on all sides. In the private sphere, capitalism
gradually emerged. In the public sphere, the practice and theory of
democracy shifted, particularly with the acceptance of more widespread
citizen participation.128 Toward the end of the twentieth century, one
crucial, though often ignored, development triggered the transition to
Democracy, Inc.
Oddly, America’s Cold-War victory precipitated Democracy, Inc. After
World War II, the Cold-War battle spurred the economy, especially
corporate capitalism.129 Yet, the Cold War also constrained corporate
124. “Madison’s political thought was characterized by an often agonized effort to find a
working balance between the rights of property and republican principles.” Id.; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison) (arguing that the new government would be “in favour
of private rights and public happiness”).
125. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE 9–11 (1996).
126. James Wilson, In the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra
note 64, at 141, app. A; see NOVAK, supra note 125, 9–11 (emphasizing that the superiority
of the public over the private sphere continued at least through the nineteenth century).
127. NOVAK, supra note 125, at 9–11.
128. For a history of American democracy (but not including Democracy, Inc.) in relation
to free expression, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008).
129. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC 124–27 (1st ed. 2004); see also MARY L.
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 243
(William Chafe et al. eds., 2000) (emphasizing that capitalism “was championed” during the
Cold War).
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capitalism on both the international and domestic fronts. The political
geography of the Cold War limited the international scope of corporate
markets. McDonald’s could not open a franchise in Prague or Moscow in
1975.130 Equally important, the Cold-War struggle against communism
tempered potential corporate calls for laissez-faire and attacks on the
process and culture of democratic government. If the alternative to
American democracy was totalitarian communism, then critics of
democracy needed to curb their denunciations. The government and
capitalist leaders, in effect, bonded together in struggle against the
communist enemy.131
With the end of the Cold War, these constraints on corporate
capitalism evaporated. An increasing number of corporations went
multinational, with many flocking into former Iron-Curtain countries.132
McDonald’s became “McWorld,” opening in Prague, Moscow, and dozens
of other cities formerly behind the Iron Curtain.133 Multinational
corporations aggressively sought to reach as many consumers as possible,
wherever they lived. Corporate business and investment began to flow
around the globe as if national borders no longer existed.134 By 2002,
approximately fifty multinational corporations were wealthier than
between 120 and 130 nations.135 Moreover, in the United States, the
government and corporate capitalists no longer fought together against a
common foe. To the contrary, many capitalists now viewed government as
the enemy. Demands for laissez-faire became common and insistent.
Libertarian icon, F.A. Hayek, argued that the world was too complex for
government to predict and control.136 “Human reason can neither predict
nor deliberately shape its own future,” he wrote, “Progress by its very
nature cannot be planned.”137 Any type of government planning or
regulation smacked of hubris. The invisible hand and the market
130. See Benjamin J. Cohen, Bretton Woods System, in ROUTLEDGE, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 95 (R.J. Barry Jones ed., 2001) (discussing the
postwar international marketplace).
131. Joseph D. Phillips, Economic Effects of the Cold War, in CORPORATIONS AND THE
COLD WAR 173 (David Horowitz ed., 1969); see also JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A
NEW HISTORY 35–36, 61–63 (2005) (discussing interactions of government and capitalists
during the Cold War).
132. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 248–49 (1995).
133. Id. at 249; see also KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN RICH 147–56 (1st ed. 2002) (describing the growth of corporations).
134. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 90, at 174; OHMAE, supra note 90, at 2–
5, 7.
135. CHANDLER & MAZLISH, supra note 90, at 1.
136. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 52 (Ronald
Hamowy ed., 2011).
137. Id. at 94–95.
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accounted for human desires and actions far more efficiently. The market
“looks like chaos to the naked eye,” explained Milton Friedman, “[yet it]
is a system which enables the dispersed knowledge and skill of millions of
people to be coordinated for a common purpose.”138
Cold-War victory, in short, triggered the onset of Democracy, Inc.,
with dangerous implications for American constitutionalism. Billionaires
and multinational, profit-crazed corporate behemoths control elections
and government for their own advantage, yet political polarization and
gridlock prevent the national government from protecting the public and
the Constitution. Market fundamentalists, inspired like religious zealots,
follow Hayek and Friedman in spouting laissez-faire ideology. They
constantly remind Americans that democratic government is inept while
the unregulated market can resolve all social and economic problems.
Democracy, Inc., manifests the type of constitutional imbalance the
framers dreaded. They attended the Constitutional Convention precisely
because they thought the unrestrained pursuit of private passion and
interest had corrupted American government and threatened national
decay.139
History subsequent to the framing demonstrates the framers’
perspicacity. When laissez-faire is ascendant, then income and wealth
inequality increase precariously, as occurred in the 1920s, just before the
Great Depression.140 The material foundation for democratic-capitalism
cracks apart.141 Most important, then, income and wealth in Democracy,
Inc., are concentrated in a blade-thin sliver of the population.142 Gains in
American productivity have not generated increased income for the
average American worker and household.143 From 2009 to 2012, ninetyfive percent of income gains went to the top one percent.144 Democracy,
Inc., operates like Robin Hood in reverse: It takes from the poor and
middle class and gives to the rich.145

138. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ADAM SMITH’S RELEVANCE FOR TODAY 11 (1977).
139. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (W.W. Nortin & Co., 2013)
(emphasizing that gross inequality endangers democracy and capitalism).
140. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 90, at 263–67.
141. See FRED BLOCK & MARGARET R. SOMERS, THE POWER OF MARKET
FUNDAMENTALISM: KARL POLANYI’S CRITIQUE 15–16 (2014); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
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142. PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 23–27, 291–335, 350–53.
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Economic liberty and government power must remain in balance.
Neither the public nor the private should dominate the other. If either
predominates for too long, neither will survive. In the twenty-first
century, with massive multinational corporations controlling enormous
wealth, the United States government must remain strong and large to
maintain the public-private balance. The vitality of the American
democratic-capitalist system requires no less.

